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Abstract: The Chinese Internet provides space for political discussion while also being manipulated 
and controlled at the same time. Current research on media control in China has focused on the institu-
tional and technological infrastructure that monitors and censors the content of political discussion 
online. We propose that the social media companies also play a key role in creating technological set-
tings that facilitate different kinds of political discussion. Why does online public opinion seem to rise 
in some social media more easily than in others? Building on research on authoritarian deliberation we 
are describing spaces for political discussion in Chinese cyberspace in terms of interactivity, which 
results in different forms of political discussion. Drawing on semi-structured qualitative expert inter-
views with ICT professionals at Tencent, Weibo, and Baidu we explain how major social media differ 
in terms of their structure and the company’s motivation. We specify which features are more likely to 
facilitate the rise of online public opinion in Chinese social media and provide preliminary evidence 
from ninety-two semi-structured interviews with Internet users. 
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2 
Introduction 
In August 2015 800 tons of chemicals exploded at the harbor in Tianjin. Tianjin residents took pictures 
and videos with their mobile phones and posted them on the Internet. Once posted online, they were 
picked up by market-based media that brought the information to the center of public discourse. In 
most liberal democracies online discourse of public affairs is taken for granted, but this is not the case 
in China where political views could be voiced in private but not publicized in media before the digital 
age. New media have facilitated the rise of online public opinion, whereby stories discussed on the 
Web are suddenly funneled to the center of public discourse.  
Social media have created great pressure on the regime to respond. For example, after the Tianjin 
explosion Chinese President Xi Jinping called for urgent nationwide checks on dangerous chemicals 
and reviews of workplace safety and premier Li Keqiang visited the scene to investigate the situation. 
China's former vice mayor of Tianjin Yang Dongliang, at the time member of the Central Committee of 
the Chinese Communist Party and Director of State Administration for Work Safety, was sacked for 
suspected "serious breaches of discipline and the law". Another eleven government and port officials 
were prosecuted for their negligence over the massive explosions. Reilly (2012) has demonstrated that 
such public pressures limit policy options that the central leadership takes under consideration, affect 
negotiating strategy, shape official rhetoric and public debate over policy, and affect the timing and 
direction of specific policy choices (Meng, Pan and Yang, 2014). 
To a certain extent, online discussion of public affairs is tolerated and even actively promoted by 
the Chinese state. Chinese public officials are using online discussion as a means to obtain feedback on 
the policies and goals of the government (Hartford 2005, Jiang and Xu 2009) and to monitor and con-
trol the actions of local officials (Hassid, 2012). The Chinese state is actively building and promoting 
public deliberative forums on which it invites citizens to provide feedback and make policy sugges-
tions. Anybody who does not closely follow China’s Internet scene would be very surprised to learn 
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about some of the comments people are allowed to post, covering a range of topics, including local 
corruption, the environment, or financial policies (MacKinnon 2012).  
At the same time, the state also builds structures that function as a “safety belt” to control the 
content of the discussion and guide it in a direction supportive of the goals and policies of authoritarian 
rulers, if necessary. China has built an extensive system for Internet surveillance and manipulation. 
This system includes configuration of Internet gateway infrastructure (Boas 2006), blocking websites 
and filtering (Chase and Mulvenon 2002), Internet policing (Brady 2008), regulation of Internet service 
providers (MacKinnon 2009), suppression of dissident use and discipline of cyber cafes (Chase and 
Mulvenon 2002, Qiu 2000). As the state is clamping down on online public opinion, Internet users 
have grown savvy at expressing themselves through political satire and ironic uses of politically correct 
language to subvert controls (Yang 2009, Esarey and Xiao 2008). 
 Increasingly, the Chinese state has moved away from using coercive towards using softer means 
of control. While media companies are embedded into the state infrastructure, censorship is in practice 
outsourced to companies and users (MacKinnon 2012, Morozov 2011). An army of web commentators 
disguised as ordinary netizens shape and alter online public discourse (Bandurski 2008). Under Xi 
Jinping many party and state units have been building online portals and apps that encourage users to 
connect to an emerging e-governance system. In doing so, the state is occupying space for online dis-
cussion and coopts online public opinion (Han 2015). 
 While most of the discussion of the Chinese Internet has focused on the ways in which the Chi-
nese state directly shapes and manipulates cyberspace, here we focus on subtle ways that seem apoliti-
cal on the surface but have important consequences for politics. While traditional media assume com-
munication between a sender and a receiver, the Internet is by definition interactive. The interactive 
features of social media platforms structure public discourse and facilitate the development of online 
opinion in different ways. Taking an inductive approach, we conducted semi-structured interviews with 
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twenty academics and product managers of the social media companies Tencent, Weibo, and Baidu 
between January and May 2015. Drawing on these insights from experts, our main aim is to conceptu-
alize the structures shaping the expression of opinions on public affairs, which we refer to as online 
public opinion. By comparing Weibo, WeChat and Baidu Tieba as the three most popular social media 
in China, we demonstrate that social media are created with a business goal in mind, but optimizing the 
platform towards one general core function creates an environment that fosters certain kinds fo political 
behavior. We then hypothesize and provide preliminary evidence from ninety-two semi-structured in-
terviews with Internet users that the Twitter-like Weibo has the potential to directly challenge state 
autonomy over information and therefore facilitates the rise of information cascades most strongly, 
while Tieba and WeChat’s potential concentrates on aiding in the formation of opinions and incubating 
issues that may then be disseminated via other social media platforms. Social media provide opportuni-
ties for politically motivated users to capture the platform for political purposes. Where and when pub-
lic opinion forms and spreads in Chinese cyberspace has important implications for the pressure the 
Internet exerts onto policy-makers. 
 The Chinese states outsources the design of these interactive features to commercial companies, 
which makes politics by definition harder to detect, but by investigating the incentives built into the 
design we tease out their relevance for information processing and the expression of opinions about 
public affairs. These incentives are intended to increase profit but have unintended consequences for 
the development of online public opinion. Political considerations enter the design of social media plat-
forms indirectly as commercial companies anticipate how technological designs fit with the broader 
strategy towards managing online public opinion.   
 
Informal Political Talk and Online Activism 
Most social media are designed for other purposes than for political talk, but in practice, many users 
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use digital technology to share news, post political messages and comment on issues of relevance to 
public policies. While most scholars would likely agree attention to news does not constitute participa-
tion per se, political discussion or talk occupies something of a “gray” area. For example, Delli Carpini, 
Cook, and Jacobs (2004), argue that political discussion constitutes “sharing of public life;” informal 
talk about politics becomes a political act (Bennett, Flickinger, and Rhine 2000 2000, Pan et al. 2006). 
Vegh (2003) proposes that there are progressive steps of online activism, ranging from seeking and 
disseminating political information and opinions to more radical forms of direct action such as hack-
tivism. Similarly, a growing body of research on online public opinion in China regards the expression 
of political views online as online activism. For example, in 2009 the Chinese Academy of Social Sci-
ence published a report on the growing challenge of online activism in China. This report identifies a 
“new opinion class” that consists of netizens who are concerned with news and current affairs. These 
netizens express their opinions online and “gather consensus, transform emotions, induce action and 
influence society within a very short period of time” (Xiao 2011, p.221). Online activism in that sense 
is defined as the expression of an opinion on public affairs and participation in online political dis-
course. In the context of the Internet the boundaries between political talk and public opinion are 
blurred. 
 In this discussion about the rise of online public opinion in China we see a return to an earlier 
scholarly discussion that described the nature of public opinion as a mode of communication. Today, 
public opinion is commonly regarded as the aggregate of individual attitudes within a particular social 
group whereby each individual’s attitude is weighted equally (Converse 1987). Yet before polling and 
surveys became the predominant form of measuring public opinion, researchers often described public 
opinion as a communication process, blurring the boundaries between public opinion and political par-
ticipation. Allport (1937) noted that public opinion requires the verbalization of opinions on an issue 
widely known to a group of individuals and that public opinion represents an action or a readiness for 
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action by individuals who are aware of others reacting to the same situation. Davison (1958) described 
the rise of such public opinion as a process that starts with the incubation of an issue in small group 
discussion and the emergence of leadership that formulates and spreads the issue, influencing the atti-
tudes and behaviors of others. Through inter-group communication it becomes known by a large num-
ber of people, whereby the issue becomes public. A large number of people start to discuss the issue 
and form their own opinion and adjust their behaviors based on expectation of others’ opinions and 
behaviors. While they may set the agenda in the process, they may also influence public opinion by 
framing, priming or persuading others. In response, they might or might not take other political actions 
in order to change policies. Similar to Blumer (Blumer 1948), Allport (1937) and Davison (1958) un-
derstood public opinion as part of socio-political processes, mirroring the organization of society into 
social groups.  
 Interpersonal social networks play an important role in the formation of an issue and the trans-
mission of the issue to a large number of people. Within social networks, acquaintances, corresponding 
to weak ties, are essential to exchange important information (Granovetter, 1973), because people tend 
to know roughly the same as their friends, corresponding to strong ties. At the same time, trust and loy-
alty experienced in strong ties have the power to exert social pressure and motivate people to become 
politically active (della Porta 1988, Klandermans and Stekelenburg 2013). In a closely knit network 
people may choose to express encouragement or approval in order to motivate friends (Coleman 1990, 
Flache and Macy 1996). Messages can spread quickly and become viral starting in strong and weak 
social networks (Lotan 2011). 
 Opinion leaders or influencers play a strong role in the emergence of information cascades, as 
suggested by Davison (1958).  A very small number of people who are highly connected to others serve 
as hubs to spread information (see, for example, Gladwell). Those opinion leaders generate information 
cascades online, but more sporadically than is commonly believed. Newer and less influential users can 
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cause breakouts because of subject matter, topic, timing, format, and trustworthiness of the message 
(such as video, image, or news story or petition) (see, for example, Bakshy et al. 2011, Goel et al. 2016, 
Lotan 2012). Overall, the emergence of information cascades is highly unpredictable. 
 Mass communication has the advantage of expediting information exchange and inter-group 
communication (Davison, 1958). The so-called ‘social affordance’ literature is concerned with the role 
of digital technology in changing people’s communication behavior. Researchers have convincingly 
shown that the Internet fosters the maintenance of multiple communication streams with more diverse 
and geographically distant people (Boase et al. 2006; Wellman 2001). Different authors suggest that the 
Internet is conducive to the development of weak ties providing opportunities for people to expand 
disparate friendship and organizational networks (Best and Krueger 2006; Hampton 2003; Hay-
thornthwaite 2002; Kavanaugh et al. 2005). These features facilitate the emergence of information cas-
cades in comparison to offline social networking. 
We build on this discussion by specifying the technological settings that create environments 
facilitating or hindering the emergence of online public opinion. Research on political talk in small 
groups has demonstrated that the circumstances within which discussion takes place has a strong influ-
ence on online public opinion (see, for example, Delli Carpini, Cook, and Jacobs 2004). Governments 
relying on participatory forms of governance for political decision-making strategize about how to best 
organize and manage political discourse in deliberative settings (see, for example, Lodge and Wegrich 
2015). Because rational argumentation, consideration of multiple viewpoints, and respect between par-
ticipants are by most scholarly accounts rare on the Web, some online deliberative technologies have 
emerged specifically designed to foster deliberation deemed to be conducive to democracy (see, for 
example, Freelon et al. 2012). 
Our first contribution to is to specify the interactive features of the technological design in so-
cial media platforms that may facilitate or hinder online public opinion. Most observers would agree 
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that online public opinion originates in social media settings that are designed by commercial compa-
nies. Users are paying for the service of social media companies by providing the company with their 
data created by the use of the service, which directly translates into commercial income for the compa-
ny. As a result, incentives are built into the design of social media platforms to increase the number of 
users and their level of engagement. It is important to understand which incentives companies aim to 
maximize when developing digital social technology and how these create incentives to contribute to 
online public opinion.  
 Our second contribution is to expand our understanding of the actions contributing to online 
public opinion. In the discussion on information diffusion in digital social networks scholars have fo-
cused on easily observable measures, such as re-tweets and likes (Cebrian, Rahwan, and Pentland 
2016). Yet simply forwarding a message does not necessarily imply that the person agrees with a polit-
ical message. Instead, users express political views, such as posting an original tweet, commenting on a 
message, and forwarding a message with a comment. In addition to these actions aimed at expressing 
opinions online, we also focus on actions taken to engage more deeply with online information, such as 
searching information as well as close reading as opposed to simply skimming text. Compared to simi-
lar offline behaviors these actions gain greater participatory quality in the online environment: “For 
news consumption, the greater opportunities available in the online sphere for individuals to seek out 
sources and share them with others may also be leading to an ‘‘upgrading’’ of this mode of engagement 
into a more active participatory form” (Gibson and Cantijoch 2013, 704-714). Such greater awareness 
and reflection also contributes to the rise of public opinion, as understood by Allport (1937) and Da-
vison (1958), though ultimately attitudes only become part of online public opinion once they are ex-
pressed via text, images, audio, or video files, creating content.  
 To show how technological design facilitates actions aimed at deepening engagement with po-
litical information (searching information, skimming text, close reading of text) and at expressing opin-
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ion (posting, commenting, forwarding with comments) we focus on social media that are most likely to 
contribute to the rise of online public opinion. Next we explain which spaces for online public opinion 
exist in Chinese cyberspace and why we decided to focus on Wechat, Weibo and Tieba.  
 
Chinese Social Media and Space for Online Public Opinion 
Social media allow users to connect, communicate, and interact with each other, often by posting, shar-
ing, or co-producing information (Correa, Hinsley, and Zúñiga 2010). These two functions - social in-
teraction and information-sharing - are at the core of social media. We classify spaces for online public 
opinion in Chinese cyberspace according to two dimensions: the first dimension relates to the degree to 
which individual users or formal organizations, such as traditional media outlets or state or party insti-
tutions, distribute information on the site. The second dimension depends on how much reciprocity 
between users supporting interactive conversation between users as opposed to a one-dimensional con-
versation from a sender to receivers the platform allows. Space for online public opinion can be 
mapped onto the two-dimensional construct of social media (Figure 1). 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
In this two-dimensional space, news websites belong to the bottom left, as journalists and editors 
of news websites disseminate information as part of an organization. While websites often allow users 
to comment on articles, users usually do not interact with each other when commenting; instead, the 
conversation is primarily between the news agency as the sender and the user as the receiver, with 
some opportunities to give feedback.  
Wikipedia-like websites, such as Baidu Baike, the Chinese version of Wikipedia, are located at 
the bottom right, since all content on this type of websites is generated by users. The similarity between 
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Wikipedia-like websites and news online portals is that they have limited features for users to interact 
directly with each other. On Q&A websites, such as Baidu Zhidao and Zhihu, users generate questions 
and answers; they can also comment and rate answers or provide a better answer, which allows some 
levels of interaction between users. As such, these websites are also located at the spectrum on the right 
but offer more reciprocity between users than Wikipedia-like websites. 
At the top left spectrum, we locate online deliberative forums organized by governments or social 
organizations. Especially local governments utilize online space for public hearings to obtain citizens’ 
feedback and complaints about policies (see, for example, Zhang 2015). These online deliberative 
meetings are organized by organizations and participants are allowed to input their opinions directly 
onto the forums.  
The top right of Figure 1 is the space for political discussion we are most interested in, because 
most messages that become viral originate here, according to our interviews. These social media plat-
forms support reciprocal conversation between users and offer users at least some opportunities to be-
come the source of information. Among those sites we focus on Sina Weibo, Baidu Tieba and Wechat 
as the three social media platforms with largest user base in Chinese cyberspace.1 
Sina Weibo was initially a Chinese Twitter but later started to incorporate more Facebook-like 
social features.2 Weibo is the only vibrant micro-blogging platform nowadays in China with 175.7 mil-
lion monthly active users3. Baidu Tieba is a BBS-like chat forum with an average of 50 million new 
posts posted per day.4 Wechat is the most popular instant messenger in China with 500 million monthly 
active users, developed by Tencent.5 In contrast to QQ, the other popular instant messenger developed 
by the same company, Wechat is a mobile phone based app. As such these three social media platforms 
provide three of the largest spaces for informal political discussion in Chinese cyberspace.  
Weibo, Wechat and Tieba vary in terms of the two-dimensions of online media. The Twitter-like 
Weibo offers anyone the power to become the source of information, including users and organizations, 
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particularly traditional media outlets; on Tieba users are allowed to set up their own group and attract 
other users who share similar interest by sharing information. WeChat, on the other hand, emerged as 
an instant messenger and therefore allows for a high degree of social interaction between users which 
can be in various formats (namely, text, audio, video or picture) and in various settings (one-to-one or 
group chatting). In addition to the instant messenger, WeChat also has a Facebook “wall” called “mo-
ments” allowing users to post content. But, only links created by WeChat public accounts, various 
online websites or mainstream media’s accounts can be shared. In order to generate public information 
that can be shared on moments, users need to open a public account, which is open to both, organiza-
tions and individuals. As the platform facilitates a more formal organization of users into public ac-
counts, it is placed more towards the left spectrum compared to Weibo and Baidu Tieba. 
 
Business Goals and Incentives Built into Social Media Platforms 
The Chinese state outsources the design of social media to commercial companies, which makes poli-
tics by definition harder to detect. In our conversations we focused on interactivity as the defining 
characteristics: social media allow users to communicate and interact with each other, whereby infor-
mation (content and data) is generated.6 This language allowed us to tease out key features of techno-
logical design that have unintended consequences for online public opinion. 
 Social media companies have a great incentive to increase interactivity, because interactivity is 
their source of revenue. Most Chinese social media companies are based on business models that gen-
erate income by using their data to target advertising. 7 The greater the data set of users and the more 
active the users, the larger the income and potential profit by the social media company.8 As one senior 
product manager put it: “Increasing number of users, increasing level of influence9 and increasing 
amount of revenue generated are the three key purposes for every social media product.”10 
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Because of the commercial rationale for designing technology that increases the level of interac-
tivity, product managers start designing the social media product with market research, starting by un-
derstanding the users’ needs and demands.11 In his response to the question “what feature is most im-
portant to interactivity”, an Android app designer commented that: “The most important point […] is 
how to make the feature satisfy users’ emotion need. It can be the need to compete with others and to 
win. This emotional need is always there, but the question is how to trigger this need of users or how to 
gratify users’ vanity”.12 Such user needs can range from social needs, such as, for example, attracting 
others’ attention, gaining respect, being envied by others, competing, and sharing,13 to information 
needs, such as, for example, seeking information or knowing people who share similar interests14. Oth-
er social media also seek to be fun to play with and satisfy entertainment needs of users.15 Because we 
focus on social media that play an important role in online public opinion, the needs that social media 
experts identified as central to WeChat, Weibo, and Tieba are seeking information, strengthening 
knowledge and understanding, gaining respect as well as social needs to develop and maintain social 
networks.  
 Social media experts emphasize that product managers make a choice as to which user need to 
concentrate on when designing the platform. We call those the platform’s core functions, which is 
linked to user need. For example, a marketing researcher of Weibo explains that Weibo is maximized 
towards making people into the source of information; therefore, interactive technology strengthens 
information needs on Weibo.16 In contrast, WeChat was designed to maximize the maintenance of in-
timate social interaction between friends, family, and acquaintances, satisfying social needs. 17 Tieba 
focuses on bringing people with similar interest together and promoting discussion within each interest 
group, which places information needs at its core. When designing technology, this core function forms 
the standard according to which the company invests resources to develop the platform and in terms of 
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how the company measures its success in attracting users and keeping them engaged with the plat-
form.18 
 These examples reveal the commercial rationale behind technological design. None of the social 
media platforms we focus on here are built with a political purpose in mind, but instead intend to satis-
fy certain user demands, broadly defined. Below we uncover how the incentives built into the techno-
logical design of WeChat, Weibo, and Tieba facilitate or hinder political engagement and expression as 
one unintended way in which users use social technology. To uncover these incentives, we talked to 
social media experts about the platforms interactivity. 
 
Interactive Design of Weibo, WeChat, and Tieba 
Interactivity constitutes a way for us to discuss politics with project managers in an apolitical way. 
Building on research by Sally J. McMillan and Jang-Sun Hwang (2002), we asked social media experts 
about the platform’s responsiveness to messages and control of the user over the communication. These 
elements of a platform’s interactive technological design enable us to assess how the platform struc-
tures the communication process. Responsiveness and user control aim to strengthen the platform’s 
core function. According to social media experts, responsiveness captures the timely and correct re-
sponses users receive either from the system or from other users, while user control offers users a sense 
of control over the social media platform and the ability to take certain tasks in line with the core func-
tion. 19 Next we explain how responsiveness and user control figure into the structure of communica-
tion on WeChat, Weibo, and Tieba, according to our interviews. 
 
User control 
User control manifests itself in terms of choices that users have over the social media platform (e.g., 
Laurel 1986, 1997). Weibo originally copied most of the choices for users from Twitter, but has added 
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additional choices to its original design to accommodate trends related to its core function. These 
choices are always made based on considerations regarding whether they help users to become the 
source of information and manage information they receive. Weibo has a 140-word limit on tweets 
enabling fast dissemination and consumption of key information while also allows users to attach long 
articles to a post in order to better integrate bloggers as new sources for information. 20 In addition, us-
ers also can post pictures in their comments in order to share information. 21 Most importantly, Weibo 
users can group accounts they follow and view information by these groups. From Weibo manager’s 
point of view22, this function is crucial for its core function as it helps to reduce information flow for 
users, which tends to be massive on Weibo. This function, technically speaking, is not difficult to de-
velop. But both WeChat and Baidu Tieba do not have this function, because seeking information is 
only a secondary feature for WeChat, while information is always contained and grouped within inter-
est groups on Baidu Tieba.  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Compared to Weibo, Tieba focuses on seeking and generating information within interest groups, 
which manifests itself in two key user choices, according to one Tieba product manager: first, any user 
of Tieba can form a group and become a group administrator in charge of managing a group. Second, 
Tieba offers a unique design called “mezzanine floor comment structure” (see Figure 2). In architec-
ture, a mezzanine floor is an intermediate floor between the main floors of a building and is not count-
ed as a floor. On Tieba it refers to all replies to a comment appearing underneath a comment, instead of 
the original post; and these replies are part of the comment they are linked to. This unique feature aims 
to promote discussion within interest groups and the development of sub-groups and new interest 
groups. Users can leave the current group and form another new group based on joined interest. 
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Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
In contrast to Weibo and Tieba, WeChat focuses on maintaining intimate social relationships. 
WeChat does this by offering users various options to chat, such as text, voice, and short video. As a 
very popular feature, users can record and send voice messages with a maximum length one minute 
each. When using WeChat’s instant messenger, users can create different groups and have group chats. 
Neither Weibo nor Tieba is able to compete with Wechat on this aspect.  “I think Weibo realized the 
importance of social interaction and did develop some group chat functions before; but the products 
containing social interaction functions were not popular and failed in the end.”23 On Tieba users leave 
each other QQ number or WeChat number if they want to contact each other outside of Tieba platform. 
One Tieba product manager admitted that social interaction feature is not Tieba’s strength: “we should 
just continue with the current division of labor and do what we are good at.”24 
By contrast, WeChat has limitations built into information sharing, which mostly takes place 
via public accounts on Moments. WeChat users gain access to public accounts via subscription ac-
counts (, Dingyuehao). “On Dingyuehao, the list of public accounts is folded and users need to 
click on subscription accounts button to unfold the list. And each public account is allowed to post once 
per day, although there is no restriction on the number of articles each account can post per time.”25As 
a professor in new media explained, “WeChat does not want user experience of social interactions to be 
interrupted by the dissemination of public information.”26 
Overall, a formal and structural organization of information is required for WeChat users if they 
want to generate information that can be disseminated. In comparison, Weibo and Tieba users enjoy 
more freedom to generate information, but the difference between Weibo and Tieba lies in whether 
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information is organized based on the individual user or the interest of a group of users. By contrast, 
WeChat offers users more options to interact with others socially.  
 
Responsiveness 
The relatedness of sequential messages is one important aspect of responsiveness (Rafaeli, 1988, 
p.111). With regards to social interactions, responsiveness is straightforward: “when you ask a ques-
tion, someone will answer it; when you post a picture, someone will give you a thumb-up; when you 
express a terrible experience you had, someone will give you sympathy. It means that you can get what 
you want immediately.”27 WeChat’s instant messenger offers real time one-to-one communication and 
group communication and is therefore strong in this regard. If users wanted to engage in one-to-one 
communication or a small group chat on Weibo or Tieba, they usually move to an instant messenger, 
even though Weibo and Tieba also offer a private messenger as a feature, according to product manag-
ers. As an associate professor in media and communication explained, WeChat “users can communi-
cate with others anytime and anywhere they want”. 28 WeChat provides more responsiveness between 
users under the setting of real time communication. 
 Regarding information-sharing, however, WeChat is less responsive compared to Weibo and 
Tieba. When forwarding the relatedness of sequential messages is largely maintained on Weibo: users 
can forward posts with any picture, link, or video and subsequent comments about the original post by 
others, as long as it does not exceed the 140-word limit.  Tieba, on the other hand, uses the “mezzanine 
floor comment structure,” which categorizes messages and replies about the same issue into one group 
and increases the relatedness of sequential messages. 29 On WeChat, however, only links created by 
WeChat public accounts, various online websites or mainstream media’s accounts can be forwarded 
and the comments about the links by users’ contacts cannot be shared unless users manually copy and 
paste the comments to the new posts.   
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Another important aspect of responsiveness is how responsive the system is to the preferences set 
by the user. As a marketing researcher of a social network site in China mentioned30, Weibo and Tieba 
both deliver posts that match the user’s interest, while on WeChat Moments posts are ordered in chron-
ological order and on subscription accounts of WeChat, users just get what they subscribe to. WeChat 
does not recommend public accounts, for example, that match user’s interest.  
The final aspect of responsiveness is the speed of information delivery. Public account users on 
WeChat are allowed to post once per day, regardless of the number of article posted per time. In other 
words, information on public accounts of WeChat is only updated once per day. On Weibo and Baidu 
Tieba, there is no such restriction and users can post any time as they want. As such, information is 
more up to date on Weibo and Baidu Tieba.  
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
As can be seen, on seeking and generating information, Weibo and Baidu Tieba are more respon-
sive in that they maintain the relatedness of sequential messages, are responsive to user’s preference 
when delivering information and allow timely delivery of information. Tieba arranges information ac-
cording to topics, while Weibo arranges information according to users.31 WeChat, on the other hand, 
is more responsive on social interactions by allowing users to chat in real time.  
 
Privacy Settings and Social Networks  
As mentioned earlier, existing literature on social media has mostly focused on how the structure of 
social networks within social media platforms contributes to information diffusion and public discourse 
taking place. Although our focus here is on responsiveness and user control it is also helpful to explain 
how digital technology manages the structure of social networks via its public and private settings.  
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Insert Table 3 here 
 
Due to its emphasis on close ties in small groups, WeChat poses restrictions on access to infor-
mation based on a user’s contacts. Information on Weibo and Tieba, however, is accessible to any user 
of the platform. On Weibo, a user can view posts by other users regardless of whether they are friends 
with each other or not; unless a user sets restrictions on who can view the posts, what the user posts is 
also accessible to any user on Weibo. The difference between Weibo and Baidu Tieba is where infor-
mation is located: Information posted on Tieba can be found within each interest group, while infor-
mation posted on Weibo is on each user’s own page. Similarly, on WeChat, users can only interact with 
their contacts, while on Weibo and Baidu Tieba, users can interact with any user on the platform.  
 Decisions about which information remains private and which is accessible to the public are 
closely linked to the social networks of the platform: “Wechat is like a living room and Weibo is like a 
square […]: [on a square] everyone can voice their opinions regardless of whether they know each oth-
er, while you will only invite people who you know to your living room”.32 Tieba is a place where peo-
ple can find others with similar interest and discussions are arranged according to themes of interest 
and thus contained within each discussion forum. As such, Tieba is like a workshop for those who are 
interested in the topic and others are free to join.33  
 
Interactivity and Online Public Opinion 
How do responsiveness and user control relate to the rise of online public opinion? Here, we offer some 
preliminary evidence based on qualitative interviews with ninety-two users, varying in terms of gender, 
education, age, and region. Interviews with Internet users were conducted over two periods - between 
January and May 2015 and between Oct 2015 and March 2016. 34  In our semi-structured interviews we 
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asked users how they used WeChat, Tieba, and Weibo in order to talk to each other or share infor-
mation regarding politics.35   
 As explained earlier, when a concern or problem is formed, the issue is first discussed in a group 
that is hospitable to it (Davison, 1958). When discussion takes place on WeChat’s instant messenger 
the platform can contribute to incubating an issue. A few interviewees explained that when they find 
interesting news or information on WeChat, they prefer to share it with their friends one-to one or with-
in a group chat, instead of sharing it on Moments.36 Because WeChat structures communication within 
close networks, users express hesitation to voice and discuss politics on Moments. 
For example, a female interviewee explained that she recently posted an original post about her 
positive views of homosexuality on Moments of WeChat where she was cautious to express her view 
implicitly in the context of a movie called “Blue is the warmest color,” a love story between two fe-
males on her moments.37 Instead of expressing her view directly, she related the movie to an influential 
TV show in China called “Weirdo talk”38 which challenges mainstream views and talked about the so-
cial implication of such movies and shows. “I have relatives, friends, colleagues from work on my 
WeChat’s contact list, and I have to be prepared that all of them will see what I write. I need to keep 
this in mind when I write.”39 When being asked whether she receives the comments she expected, she 
replied: “There was very few comments and not a single one joined the discussion. Even those few 
comments are social comments, such as liking the post, or commenting that your new profile picture is 
beautiful, or comments like ‘homosexual movie?’. But none of my contacts engage in the discussion 
about the movie, about the social implication of the movie or about the development of Chinese socie-
ty”.40 She felt that comments and responses on WeChat are hijacked by social politeness, that is people 
respond “not because I feel passionate to do it, but because I feel like I should”.41 Because of social 
politeness induced by the focus of WeChat on social interactions between contacts, many interviewees 
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perceive WeChat a tool for social communication and interactions, a perfect substitution for the mobile 
phone message function42, but not for voicing and disseminating opinions.43 
Tieba, on the other side, serves as an issue incubator for public opinion. Allowing each user to set 
up their own interest group and the unique “mezzanine floor comment structure” facilitate the for-
mation of issue publics. People who find out that they share similar views about an issue set up their 
own sub-groups and continue further discussion about the issue. Facts and opinions about the issue 
concerned can be fully discussed and revealed under such a group setting. Although Tiaba is not de-
signed for the purpose of discussing politics, the group structure enables heated discussion regarding 
any issues, including politics, and facilitates the formation of common opinions within the group.44 In 
addition, setting up and managing a new group on Tieba inevitably leads to the formation of a group 
structure and group leadership, which facilitates the emergence of leadership at the issue formation 
stage. 45 A male Weibo and Tieba user explained the difference between the two platforms as follows: 
“On Tieba, we gather together because we all like, let say, one super star, and we get to know all in-
formation about him and activities organized to support him. And members can interact with each other, 
which Weibo does not have. I mean that members can comment underneath the main post and there is 
mezzanine floor comment structure that we can even interact underneath a comment.”46 On Tieba he 
has a sense of belonging to a group that has a structure and the members of which share common inter-
est, while on Weibo he does not have this sense of belonging. This sense of belonging to a community 
or group is conducive to the discussion and formation of opinions (Klandermans and Stekelenburg 
2013). For an issue to survive, to develop and to disseminate, small groups need to be hospitable to the 
issue (Davison, 1958) and act as “a radiating nucleus for an idea” (Lasswell, 1930, p.187).  
Weibo offers users the power to be the source of information, compared to Baidu Tieba and 
Wechat, it lacks the group structure that could help bring about discussion of an issue during the incu-
bation stage. Yet, it is the key venue for the discussion about an issue to transit small groups and be-
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come a topic for inter-group communication. In other words, Weibo turns an issue discussed in small 
groups into a public issue. Several features of Weibo facilitate this process. First, users have a wide 
range of choice over the format of posts and thus facilitate the fast production of information about the 
issue concerned in breadth. Second, relatedness of sequential comments on Weibo facilitates the dis-
cussion of the issue concerned in depth. Last but not least, Weibo is accessible to the public and thus 
help to raise awareness of the issue among a large number of people. The male interviewee mentioned 
above also pointed out the ability of Weibo to turn an issue into a public issue: “Information can spread 
very quickly [on Weibo]. For example, as far as I know, most information about corruption and other 
negative news emerge as discussion topics on Tieba; but these news are shared and forwarded by a 
significant large audience at a very short time through Weibo. [......] [On Weibo, for example] I want to 
record an issue or publish a piece of news; and others might have seen it and forwarded it; and this 
chain of forwarding the post can go from one to ten, from ten to a hundred and then from hundreds to 
thousands of people. At the end, everyone knows the issue. This is one reason why many people are 
still using Weibo.”47 In other words, the ability of Weibo to allow dissemination of information and 
opinions to a large number of people in a fast manner is a key selling point of Weibo, from the user’s 
perspective. Forwarding feature on Weibo, different from WeChat, contains sequential comments about 
the original link or post allowing the dissemination of opinions and users get to see how an idea is 
developed.  
Compared to WeChat, Weibo offers greater publicness but it does not discourage political com-
munication as WeChat does on its Moments. This has to do with the social networks created by the 
public and private settings of the social media platforms. On a square, the majority of the audience a 
speaker faces are strangers, while in a living room a speaker faces visitors who know the speaker per-
sonally. As one interviewee put it: “Because [on Weibo] strangers don’t know who I am, I don’t care 
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what they might think of me; while on Moments of WeChat, it is different as everyone knows who you 
are.”48  
After an issue has been posted on Weibo, people might circulate the information back to their so-
cial groups on Wechat or Tieba, but the difference at this stage is that the issue becomes a public issue 
and is discussed in many small groups instead of few groups at the issue incubation stage. Thus, Weibo 
serves as a key venue that brings the issue to the attention of a wider audience and fosters inter-group 
communication. 
 
Conclusion 
In the debate about the potential liberalizing role of social media in authoritarian states cyber-optimists 
and cyber-skeptics have so far focused on ways in which states censor and manipulate this content, and 
ways in which users may undermine state control. Instead of state regulations and the content of online 
discussion, here we have focused on interactivity in order to explore the various structures for political 
discussion that are created by the technological design of social media companies. This is an important 
dimension specific to the Internet which facilitates certain kinds of actions taken by users while limit-
ing others. By comparing Weibo, WeChat, and Baidu Tieba as the three social media with the largest 
user bases in China we have discovered that IT companies aim to attract specific kinds of users by sat-
isfying one very specific demand that users have, such as spreading information, finding people with 
common interests, and sustaining intimate relationships. Every interaction the user has with the system 
or other users is optimized towards this one core function. Core functions are kept as general as possi-
ble to attract a large and active user base, as a large and active user base directly translates into profit 
for the IT company. Social media are therefore rarely created with a particular political purpose in 
mind. 
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While Weibo clearly has the largest potential to facilitate the rise of online public opinion on polit-
ically relevant topics, we should not underestimate the potential of WeChat and Baidu Tieba for incu-
bating issues and forming opinions that are essential for public opinion to rise and mobilizing collective 
action. The group structure of Baidu Tieba is conducive to the discussion of issues among people shar-
ing similar interest and the formation of opinions. The maintenance of groups on Baidu Tieba also in-
evitably leads to the emergence of leadership that is also crucial for the rise of public opinion. But, giv-
en that Baidu Tieba is arranged according to interest, some interest groups are far more likely that oth-
ers to stimulate public opinion formation, especially those that are closely related to public interest, 
such as health related groups. Although WeChat places restrictions on generating and disseminating 
public information, its social interaction feature strengthens social bonds among people who already 
know each other. Its real time chat remains a powerful venue for people to disseminate information, 
discuss issues and incubate opinions more privately in small groups. While both are limited with re-
spect to their ability to organize around political issues, there are also possibilities. Baidu Tieba limits 
the creation of groups based on what is considered as politically sensitive topics, but politics pops up as 
a topic in groups that are organized based on non-political interest. WeChat’s real-time chat can help to 
address coordination problems, though there is restriction imposed on groups with more than 100 
members. For groups more than 100 members, each member is obliged to link their WeChat to a Chi-
nese bankcard in order to join the group. In other words, members of large group are required to regis-
ter with their real identities. While these limitations make it harder for outsiders to observe political use 
compared to the public forum Weibo, these social media still provide opportunities for users with polit-
ical motives to capture the platform.  
Social media companies in China are aware of the possibility that some users capture social me-
dia for a political purpose. However, they are also aware that social media differ in terms of their po-
tential, depending on the design. Among the three social media we study here, Weibo is the only one 
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that directly challenges state autonomy over information as it is designed to empower users to become 
the information source and spread information online in a public forum and across social media plat-
forms. Not surprisingly, when asked which social media facilitates online public opinion best, most 
interviewees state that no Chinese social media do except one: Weibo.49 Sina was able to create such a 
platform because it could sell the idea that Weibo would facilitate the guidance of online public opin-
ion by imposing a certain structure onto the discussion. An analysis of online discussion on Weibo 
about an issue, for example, can help Renmin net to find a way to construct a positive post that guides 
online discussion towards the direction in the favour of Renmin net.50 Thus, Weibo could both, serve a 
commercial purpose and simultaneously aid in guiding public opinion. Similar arguments are frequent-
ly made by traditional media outlets that have to simultaneously serve the market and the state (see, for 
example, Zhao 1998, Lee 2000, Stockmann 2013). While social media are not created with a political 
purpose in mind, commercial companies seek frames that allow them to sell the platform’s idea to the 
regime. 
In addition to working together with partners in order to actively shape online public opinion, so-
cial media companies also build politics into the technological design and management of content, de-
pending on the platforms potential to contribute to information cascades. Depending on the platform’s 
potential to contribute to information cascades, different strategies of censorship and control are built 
into the platform. For example, on WeChat, it is difficult to spread information due to limitations im-
posed on the number of people who can be added to a group. For groups with more than 100 members, 
every member needs to link their bank account with their WeChat. “It is an act that requires you to 
submit some documentations. Why? Because small groups have no impact [while big ones have and 
thus need to be registered].”51 In contrast, “authorities only need to make sure that they control the big 
Vs [on Weibo]”52 , as they are influential in spreading information and facilitating the rise of public 
opinions. Tieba is characterized by a phenomenon called “Baoba” (), which refers to users delib-
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erately posting a massive amount of information within a short period of time. This happens frequently 
when two Tieba groups disagree with each other and continue to re-post information, using insulting 
language. The Tieba product manager drew an analogy of this phenomenon to protests: “in real life 
when people have grievances they may use protests as a means to express, which is not allowed and the 
police will take care of that. Similarly, on Tieba, we have our rules and regulations [surveillance by 
machine or human being to detect these activities on Tieba] to make sure that such kind of activities 
would not ruin our user experience.”53 These strategies remain specific to the core function for which 
the platform was created. 
Social media can be appropriated for political purposes and companies develop strategies to col-
laborate with partners to actively shape online public opinion or build in limitations to prevent infor-
mation cascades. While companies do not openly talk about the political considerations informing digi-
tal intervention, it is likely that broader trends in political climate do play a role when making decisions 
about product development. For example, space for media reporting undergo cycles of opening and 
closing depending on leadership cycles; Weibo emerged at a time when the Hu-Wen administration 
actively promoted public feedback mechanisms for policy-making at a time when space for media was 
relatively open, while WeChat emerged shortly before a leadership transition when space for media 
tends to tighten (Stockmann, 2013). Despite these broader trends that may inform decision-making of 
social media companies we have not found evidence that the Chinese state actively intervenes and 
promotes certain social media platforms via regulations. It has been speculated that a crackdown on 
opinion leaders (so-called “Big Vs”) on Weibo has diverted some users to WeChat. However, accord-
ing to our interviews54, Big Vs have become more cautious and voice their opinions less frequently as a 
result of the crackdown, which makes Weibo transit from a platform with opinion leaders at its core to 
a platform where content is mostly created by ordinary users. The crackdown had a stronger influence 
on content than user numbers.   
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Overall, social media are primarily designed to attract a large and active user base. With one func-
tion at its core, social media can be appropriated for political purposes by users. Platforms like Tieba 
and WeChat will not take over the role of Weibo, simply because they were designed to satisfy de-
mands that are not directly challenging the autonomy of the state over information. Despite these hid-
den politics in technological design, political considerations still enter the design of social media plat-
forms as commercial companies anticipate how technological designs fit with the broader strategy to-
wards managing online public opinion. By actively shaping and manipulating the broader information 
environment the government can indirectly influence product design and facilitate digital innovation to 
foster the power of online public opinion or inhibit it. 
 
 
Notes: 
                                                
1 QQ constitutes another instant messenger designed by Tencent, just like WeChat. We chose WeChat, because 
it is frequently mentioned in the discussion about online public opinion in China and because of its growing user 
base; as of June 2015 WeChat had 600 million monthly active users and QQ 800 million. Interview with a mar-
keting expert (73583), Feb 2015. 
2 Interview with a Weibo product manager (75591), Apr 2015.  
3 http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/2015-03-11/doc-iawzuney0631454.shtml, accessed on 28 May 2015. 
4 Interview with a Baidu Tieba senior manager (72906), 15 Apr 2015. 
5 http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/2015-03-18/doc-icczmvun6903718.shtml, accessed on 28 May 2015. 
6 Interview with an Android app designer (77493), Mar 2015. Interview with a Weibo product manager (75591), 
Apr 2015.  
7 Interview with a Weibo product manager (75591), Apr 2015.  
For a detailed explanation of how a user profile can be drawn with the user data, please see 
http://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MjM5MjAxMDM4MA==&mid=204130207&idx=1&sn=cb13c668214b5395
3e827a73f7f55066&scene=1&key=fbe9f9f4b565962cad29895804fc9a904cbe1e9f147f3e0f5bcff8023d929c76a7
ad0ec2b7f209dc512e3cfd08b52e9a&ascene=0&uin=NzA0NzM0OTIx&devicetype=iMac+MacBookPro11%2C
1+OSX+OSX+10.10.2+build(14C1514)&version=11020012&pass_ticket=RzV5EB8nIaTFivtqTnJ6BZ%2FSJU
LMD7eqxMaVge%2BQElgLlnlDmaEqf3lyqSIgxk11, accessed on 2 Jun 2015. 
8 A number of IT professionals we interviewed confirmed this link between interactivity and business interest 
among Chinese social media. Interview with a Weibo product manager (75591), Apr 2015. Interview with a 
Baidu Tieba senior product manager (72906), Apr 2015. Interview with an Android app designer (77493), Mar 
2015. 
9 Here, influence refers to increasing number of active users and more actions performed by users, as the number 
of monthly active users has been used widely by social media companies to indicate their influence.  
10 Interview with a Baidu Tieba senior product manager (72906), Apr 2015. 
11 Interview with a product manager of a small social media company specialized in photo sharing (76465), Apr 
2015. 
12 Interview with an Android app designer (77493), Mar 2015. 
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13 Interview with an Android app designer (77493), Mar 2015. 
14 Interview with a Baidu Tieba senior product manager (72906), Apr 2015. 
15 Interview with a marketing manager of a big social media company in China (73583), Feb 2015. 
16 Interview with a Weibo marketing researcher (73359), Apr 2015. 
17 Interview with a marketing manager of a big social media company in China (73583), Feb 2015. 
18 Interview with a Weibo marketing researcher (73359), Apr 2015. 
19 Interview with an Android App designer (77493), March 2015. Interview with a Baidu Tieba senior product 
manager (72906), April 2015. 
20 Interview with a Weibo product manager (75591), Apr 2015. 
21 Interview with a Weibo product manager (75591), Apr 2015. 
22 Interview with a Weibo product manager (75591), Apr 2015. 
23 Interview with a Weibo marketing researcher (73359), Apr 2015. 
24 Interview with a Baidu Tieba senior product manager (72906), Apr 2015. 
25 Interview with a Weibo product manager (75591), Apr 2015. 
26 Interview with a professor in new media (75919), Apr 2015. 
27 Interview with an Android app designer (77493), Mar 2015. 
28 Interview with an associate professor in media and communication (72286), Apr 2015. 
29 Interview with a Baidu Tieba senior product manager (72906), Apr 2015. 
30 Interview with a marketing research of a social network site in China (79696), April 2015. 
31 On Baidu Tieba, all replies to a comment are appeared as a part of the specific comment, while on Weibo, 
only when two persons continue to reply to each other underneath a post will the “view the communication” 
feature be available.  
32 Interview with an associate professor in political science in China (75154), April 2015.  
33 Interview with an associate professor in social psychology (71963), Mar 2015. 
34 We selected interviewees using multiple entry points to decrease selection bias in snowball sampling. Among the ninety-
two interviewees, forty-two are male and fifty are female; thirty-nine were students at higher education institutes. These 
students were selected from universities in Beijing, Changsha, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Xiamen and Zhangjiajie. In terms of 
age, our sample consists of fifty-four interviewees younger than 30, twenty-six between 30 and 49, and twelve between 50 
and 75. In terms of education, we have fifty-nine interviewees with an education of college or above. Apart from six inter-
viewees residing overseas at the time of the interview, eighty-six interviewees were living in urban cities or rural counties of 
fifteen provinces or municipalities in China. These provinces or municipalities include Anhui, Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, 
Hainan, Heilongjiang, Hubei, Hunan, Jilin, Shandong, Shanghai, Shanxi, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Tianjin. 
35 We conducted most interviews face-to-face interview and a few by telephone. We started the conversation with ques-
tions about media consumption, followed by questions about seeking information about politics and posting, 
sharing or commenting about politics on the social media platforms. In order to capture the meaning of politics 
in China’s context we prompted users with three expressions referring to politics: news and social hot topics 
(Shishi yu Shehui Redian
	), political news and social ot topics (Shizheng yu Shehuiredian

	), and national big affairs (Guojia Dashi). 
36 Interview with 88206, February 2016; Interview with 80238, December 2015.  
37 Interview with 81738, January 2016. 
38 The weirdo talk contains a debate competition on a chosen topic between two groups of debaters in each epi-
sode; and it is renowned for the wild and extreme arguments the players can make in the show. 
39 Interview with 81738, January 2016. 
40 Interview with 81738, January 2016.  
41 Interview with 81738, January 2016. 
42 Interview with 34884, February 2015. 
43 Interview with 82206, December 2015; Interview with 80238, December 2015; Interview with 89142, January 
2016. 
44 Interview with an associate professor in social psychology (71963) and an assistant professor in political sci-
ence (70696), Mar 2015. 
45 Interview with a Baidu Tieba senior product manager (72906), Apr 2015. 
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46 Interview with 80643, November 2015.  
47 Interview with 80643, November 2015. 
48 Interview with 81402, January 2016.  
49 Interviews with three academics studying social media, October 2014. 
50 Interview with a Weibo product manager (75591), Apr 2015. 
51 Interview with a former member of a provincial news center (70235), Apr 2015. 
52 Interview with a former member of a provincial news center (70235), Apr 2015. 
53 Interview with a Baidu Tieba senior product manager (72906), Apr 2015. 
54 Interview with an associate professor in social psychology (71963), Mar 2015. 
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1 
Introduction 
In August 2015 800 tons of chemicals exploded at the harbor in Tianjin. Tianjin residents took pictures 
and videos with their mobile phones and posted them on the Internet. Once posted online, they were 
picked up by market-based media that brought the information to the center of public discourse. In 
most liberal democracies online discourse of public affairs is taken for granted, but this is not the case 
in China where political views could be voiced in private but not publicized in media before the digital 
age. New media have facilitated the rise of online public opinion, whereby stories discussed on the 
Web are suddenly funneled to the center of public discourse.  
Social media have created great pressure on the regime to respond. For example, after the Tianjin 
explosion Chinese President Xi Jinping called for urgent nationwide checks on dangerous chemicals 
and reviews of workplace safety and premier Li Keqiang visited the scene to investigate the situation. 
China's former vice mayor of Tianjin Yang Dongliang, at the time member of the Central Committee of 
the Chinese Communist Party and Director of State Administration for Work Safety, was sacked for 
suspected "serious breaches of discipline and the law". Another eleven government and port officials 
were prosecuted for their negligence over the massive explosions. Reilly (2012) has demonstrated that 
such public pressures limit policy options that the central leadership takes under consideration, affect 
negotiating strategy, shape official rhetoric and public debate over policy, and affect the timing and 
direction of specific policy choices (Meng, Pan and Yang, 2014). 
To a certain extent, online discussion of public affairs is tolerated and even actively promoted by 
the Chinese state. Chinese public officials are using online discussion as a means to obtain feedback on 
the policies and goals of the government (Hartford 2005, Jiang and Xu 2009) and to monitor and con-
trol the actions of local officials (Hassid, 2012). The Chinese state is actively building and promoting 
public deliberative forums on which it invites citizens to provide feedback and make policy sugges-
tions. Anybody who does not closely follow China’s Internet scene would be very surprised to learn 
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about some of the comments people are allowed to post, covering a range of topics, including local 
corruption, the environment, or financial policies (MacKinnon 2012).  
At the same time, the state also builds structures that function as a “safety belt” to control the 
content of the discussion and guide it in a direction supportive of the goals and policies of authoritarian 
rulers, if necessary. China has built an extensive system for Internet surveillance and manipulation. 
This system includes configuration of Internet gateway infrastructure (Boas 2006), blocking websites 
and filtering (Chase and Mulvenon 2002), Internet policing (Brady 2008), regulation of Internet service 
providers (MacKinnon 2009), suppression of dissident use and discipline of cyber cafes (Chase and 
Mulvenon 2002, Qiu 2000). As the state is clamping down on online public opinion, Internet users 
have grown savvy at expressing themselves through political satire and ironic uses of politically correct 
language to subvert controls (Yang 2009, Esarey and Xiao 2008). 
 Increasingly, the Chinese state has moved away from using coercive towards using softer means 
of control. While media companies are embedded into the state infrastructure, censorship is in practice 
outsourced to companies and users (MacKinnon 2012, Morozov 2011). An army of web commentators 
disguised as ordinary netizens shape and alter online public discourse (Bandurski 2008). Under Xi 
Jinping many party and state units have been building online portals and apps that encourage users to 
connect to an emerging e-governance system. In doing so, the state is occupying space for online dis-
cussion and coopts online public opinion (Han 2015). 
 While most of the discussion of the Chinese Internet has focused on the ways in which the Chi-
nese state directly shapes and manipulates cyberspace, here we focus on subtle ways that seem apoliti-
cal on the surface but have important consequences for politics. While traditional media assume com-
munication between a sender and a receiver, the Internet is by definition interactive. The interactive 
features of social media platforms structure public discourse and facilitate the development of online 
opinion in different ways. Taking an inductive approach, we conducted semi-structured interviews with 
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twenty academics and product managers of the social media companies Tencent, Weibo, and Baidu 
between January and May 2015. Drawing on these insights from experts, our main aim is to conceptu-
alize the structures shaping the expression of opinions on public affairs, which we refer to as online 
public opinion. By comparing Weibo, WeChat and Baidu Tieba as the three most popular social media 
in China, we demonstrate that social media are created with a business goal in mind, but optimizing the 
platform towards one general core function creates an environment that fosters certain kinds fo political 
behavior. We then hypothesize and provide preliminary evidence from ninety-two semi-structured in-
terviews with Internet users that the Twitter-like Weibo has the potential to directly challenge state 
autonomy over information and therefore facilitates the rise of information cascades most strongly, 
while Tieba and WeChat’s potential concentrates on aiding in the formation of opinions and incubating 
issues that may then be disseminated via other social media platforms. Social media provide opportuni-
ties for politically motivated users to capture the platform for political purposes. Where and when pub-
lic opinion forms and spreads in Chinese cyberspace has important implications for the pressure the 
Internet exerts onto policy-makers. 
 The Chinese states outsources the design of these interactive features to commercial companies, 
which makes politics by definition harder to detect, but by investigating the incentives built into the 
design we tease out their relevance for information processing and the expression of opinions about 
public affairs. These incentives are intended to increase profit but have unintended consequences for 
the development of online public opinion. Political considerations enter the design of social media plat-
forms indirectly as commercial companies anticipate how technological designs fit with the broader 
strategy towards managing online public opinion.   
 
Informal Political Talk and Online Activism 
Most social media are designed for other purposes than for political talk, but in practice, many users 
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use digital technology to share news, post political messages and comment on issues of relevance to 
public policies. While most scholars would likely agree attention to news does not constitute participa-
tion per se, political discussion or talk occupies something of a “gray” area. For example, Delli Carpini, 
Cook, and Jacobs (2004), argue that political discussion constitutes “sharing of public life;” informal 
talk about politics becomes a political act (Bennett, Flickinger, and Rhine 2000 2000, Pan et al. 2006). 
Vegh (2003) proposes that there are progressive steps of online activism, ranging from seeking and 
disseminating political information and opinions to more radical forms of direct action such as hack-
tivism. Similarly, a growing body of research on online public opinion in China regards the expression 
of political views online as online activism. For example, in 2009 the Chinese Academy of Social Sci-
ence published a report on the growing challenge of online activism in China. This report identifies a 
“new opinion class” that consists of netizens who are concerned with news and current affairs. These 
netizens express their opinions online and “gather consensus, transform emotions, induce action and 
influence society within a very short period of time” (Xiao 2011, p.221). Online activism in that sense 
is defined as the expression of an opinion on public affairs and participation in online political dis-
course. In the context of the Internet the boundaries between political talk and public opinion are 
blurred. 
 In this discussion about the rise of online public opinion in China we see a return to an earlier 
scholarly discussion that described the nature of public opinion as a mode of communication. Today, 
public opinion is commonly regarded as the aggregate of individual attitudes within a particular social 
group whereby each individual’s attitude is weighted equally (Converse 1987). Yet before polling and 
surveys became the predominant form of measuring public opinion, researchers often described public 
opinion as a communication process, blurring the boundaries between public opinion and political par-
ticipation. Allport (1937) noted that public opinion requires the verbalization of opinions on an issue 
widely known to a group of individuals and that public opinion represents an action or a readiness for 
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action by individuals who are aware of others reacting to the same situation. Davison (1958) described 
the rise of such public opinion as a process that starts with the incubation of an issue in small group 
discussion and the emergence of leadership that formulates and spreads the issue, influencing the atti-
tudes and behaviors of others. Through inter-group communication it becomes known by a large num-
ber of people, whereby the issue becomes public. A large number of people start to discuss the issue 
and form their own opinion and adjust their behaviors based on expectation of others’ opinions and 
behaviors. While they may set the agenda in the process, they may also influence public opinion by 
framing, priming or persuading others. In response, they might or might not take other political actions 
in order to change policies. Similar to Blumer (Blumer 1948), Allport (1937) and Davison (1958) un-
derstood public opinion as part of socio-political processes, mirroring the organization of society into 
social groups.  
 Interpersonal social networks play an important role in the formation of an issue and the trans-
mission of the issue to a large number of people. Within social networks, acquaintances, corresponding 
to weak ties, are essential to exchange important information (Granovetter, 1973), because people tend 
to know roughly the same as their friends, corresponding to strong ties. At the same time, trust and loy-
alty experienced in strong ties have the power to exert social pressure and motivate people to become 
politically active (della Porta 1988, Klandermans and Stekelenburg 2013). In a closely knit network 
people may choose to express encouragement or approval in order to motivate friends (Coleman 1990, 
Flache and Macy 1996). Messages can spread quickly and become viral starting in strong and weak 
social networks (Lotan 2011). 
 Opinion leaders or influencers play a strong role in the emergence of information cascades, as 
suggested by Davison (1958).  A very small number of people who are highly connected to others serve 
as hubs to spread information (see, for example, Gladwell). Those opinion leaders generate information 
cascades online, but more sporadically than is commonly believed. Newer and less influential users can 
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cause breakouts because of subject matter, topic, timing, format, and trustworthiness of the message 
(such as video, image, or news story or petition) (see, for example, Bakshy et al. 2011, Goel et al. 2016, 
Lotan 2012). Overall, the emergence of information cascades is highly unpredictable. 
 Mass communication has the advantage of expediting information exchange and inter-group 
communication (Davison, 1958). The so-called ‘social affordance’ literature is concerned with the role 
of digital technology in changing people’s communication behavior. Researchers have convincingly 
shown that the Internet fosters the maintenance of multiple communication streams with more diverse 
and geographically distant people (Boase et al. 2006; Wellman 2001). Different authors suggest that the 
Internet is conducive to the development of weak ties providing opportunities for people to expand 
disparate friendship and organizational networks (Best and Krueger 2006; Hampton 2003; Hay-
thornthwaite 2002; Kavanaugh et al. 2005). These features facilitate the emergence of information cas-
cades in comparison to offline social networking. 
We build on this discussion by specifying the technological settings that create environments 
facilitating or hindering the emergence of online public opinion. Research on political talk in small 
groups has demonstrated that the circumstances within which discussion takes place has a strong influ-
ence on online public opinion (see, for example, Delli Carpini, Cook, and Jacobs 2004). Governments 
relying on participatory forms of governance for political decision-making strategize about how to best 
organize and manage political discourse in deliberative settings (see, for example, Lodge and Wegrich 
2015). Because rational argumentation, consideration of multiple viewpoints, and respect between par-
ticipants are by most scholarly accounts rare on the Web, some online deliberative technologies have 
emerged specifically designed to foster deliberation deemed to be conducive to democracy (see, for 
example, Freelon et al. 2012). 
Our first contribution to is to specify the interactive features of the technological design in so-
cial media platforms that may facilitate or hinder online public opinion. Most observers would agree 
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that online public opinion originates in social media settings that are designed by commercial compa-
nies. Users are paying for the service of social media companies by providing the company with their 
data created by the use of the service, which directly translates into commercial income for the compa-
ny. As a result, incentives are built into the design of social media platforms to increase the number of 
users and their level of engagement. It is important to understand which incentives companies aim to 
maximize when developing digital social technology and how these create incentives to contribute to 
online public opinion.  
 Our second contribution is to expand our understanding of the actions contributing to online 
public opinion. In the discussion on information diffusion in digital social networks scholars have fo-
cused on easily observable measures, such as re-tweets and likes (Cebrian, Rahwan, and Pentland 
2016). Yet simply forwarding a message does not necessarily imply that the person agrees with a polit-
ical message. Instead, users express political views, such as posting an original tweet, commenting on a 
message, and forwarding a message with a comment. In addition to these actions aimed at expressing 
opinions online, we also focus on actions taken to engage more deeply with online information, such as 
searching information as well as close reading as opposed to simply skimming text. Compared to simi-
lar offline behaviors these actions gain greater participatory quality in the online environment: “For 
news consumption, the greater opportunities available in the online sphere for individuals to seek out 
sources and share them with others may also be leading to an ‘‘upgrading’’ of this mode of engagement 
into a more active participatory form” (Gibson and Cantijoch 2013, 704-714). Such greater awareness 
and reflection also contributes to the rise of public opinion, as understood by Allport (1937) and Da-
vison (1958), though ultimately attitudes only become part of online public opinion once they are ex-
pressed via text, images, audio, or video files, creating content.  
 To show how technological design facilitates actions aimed at deepening engagement with po-
litical information (searching information, skimming text, close reading of text) and at expressing opin-
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ion (posting, commenting, forwarding with comments) we focus on social media that are most likely to 
contribute to the rise of online public opinion. Next we explain which spaces for online public opinion 
exist in Chinese cyberspace and why we decided to focus on Wechat, Weibo and Tieba.  
 
Chinese Social Media and Space for Online Public Opinion 
Social media allow users to connect, communicate, and interact with each other, often by posting, shar-
ing, or co-producing information (Correa, Hinsley, and Zúñiga 2010). These two functions - social in-
teraction and information-sharing - are at the core of social media. We classify spaces for online public 
opinion in Chinese cyberspace according to two dimensions: the first dimension relates to the degree to 
which individual users or formal organizations, such as traditional media outlets or state or party insti-
tutions, distribute information on the site. The second dimension depends on how much reciprocity 
between users supporting interactive conversation between users as opposed to a one-dimensional con-
versation from a sender to receivers the platform allows. Space for online public opinion can be 
mapped onto the two-dimensional construct of social media (Figure 1). 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
In this two-dimensional space, news websites belong to the bottom left, as journalists and editors 
of news websites disseminate information as part of an organization. While websites often allow users 
to comment on articles, users usually do not interact with each other when commenting; instead, the 
conversation is primarily between the news agency as the sender and the user as the receiver, with 
some opportunities to give feedback.  
Wikipedia-like websites, such as Baidu Baike, the Chinese version of Wikipedia, are located at 
the bottom right, since all content on this type of websites is generated by users. The similarity between 
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Wikipedia-like websites and news online portals is that they have limited features for users to interact 
directly with each other. On Q&A websites, such as Baidu Zhidao and Zhihu, users generate questions 
and answers; they can also comment and rate answers or provide a better answer, which allows some 
levels of interaction between users. As such, these websites are also located at the spectrum on the right 
but offer more reciprocity between users than Wikipedia-like websites. 
At the top left spectrum, we locate online deliberative forums organized by governments or social 
organizations. Especially local governments utilize online space for public hearings to obtain citizens’ 
feedback and complaints about policies (see, for example, Zhang 2015). These online deliberative 
meetings are organized by organizations and participants are allowed to input their opinions directly 
onto the forums.  
The top right of Figure 1 is the space for political discussion we are most interested in, because 
most messages that become viral originate here, according to our interviews. These social media plat-
forms support reciprocal conversation between users and offer users at least some opportunities to be-
come the source of information. Among those sites we focus on Sina Weibo, Baidu Tieba and Wechat 
as the three social media platforms with largest user base in Chinese cyberspace.1 
Sina Weibo was initially a Chinese Twitter but later started to incorporate more Facebook-like 
social features.2 Weibo is the only vibrant micro-blogging platform nowadays in China with 175.7 mil-
lion monthly active users3. Baidu Tieba is a BBS-like chat forum with an average of 50 million new 
posts posted per day.4 Wechat is the most popular instant messenger in China with 500 million monthly 
active users, developed by Tencent.5 In contrast to QQ, the other popular instant messenger developed 
by the same company, Wechat is a mobile phone based app. As such these three social media platforms 
provide three of the largest spaces for informal political discussion in Chinese cyberspace.  
Weibo, Wechat and Tieba vary in terms of the two-dimensions of online media. The Twitter-like 
Weibo offers anyone the power to become the source of information, including users and organizations, 
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particularly traditional media outlets; on Tieba users are allowed to set up their own group and attract 
other users who share similar interest by sharing information. WeChat, on the other hand, emerged as 
an instant messenger and therefore allows for a high degree of social interaction between users which 
can be in various formats (namely, text, audio, video or picture) and in various settings (one-to-one or 
group chatting). In addition to the instant messenger, WeChat also has a Facebook “wall” called “mo-
ments” allowing users to post content. But, only links created by WeChat public accounts, various 
online websites or mainstream media’s accounts can be shared. In order to generate public information 
that can be shared on moments, users need to open a public account, which is open to both, organiza-
tions and individuals. As the platform facilitates a more formal organization of users into public ac-
counts, it is placed more towards the left spectrum compared to Weibo and Baidu Tieba. 
 
Business Goals and Incentives Built into Social Media Platforms 
The Chinese state outsources the design of social media to commercial companies, which makes poli-
tics by definition harder to detect. In our conversations we focused on interactivity as the defining 
characteristics: social media allow users to communicate and interact with each other, whereby infor-
mation (content and data) is generated.6 This language allowed us to tease out key features of techno-
logical design that have unintended consequences for online public opinion. 
 Social media companies have a great incentive to increase interactivity, because interactivity is 
their source of revenue. Most Chinese social media companies are based on business models that gen-
erate income by using their data to target advertising. 7 The greater the data set of users and the more 
active the users, the larger the income and potential profit by the social media company.8 As one senior 
product manager put it: “Increasing number of users, increasing level of influence9 and increasing 
amount of revenue generated are the three key purposes for every social media product.”10 
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Because of the commercial rationale for designing technology that increases the level of interac-
tivity, product managers start designing the social media product with market research, starting by un-
derstanding the users’ needs and demands.11 In his response to the question “what feature is most im-
portant to interactivity”, an Android app designer commented that: “The most important point […] is 
how to make the feature satisfy users’ emotion need. It can be the need to compete with others and to 
win. This emotional need is always there, but the question is how to trigger this need of users or how to 
gratify users’ vanity”.12 Such user needs can range from social needs, such as, for example, attracting 
others’ attention, gaining respect, being envied by others, competing, and sharing,13 to information 
needs, such as, for example, seeking information or knowing people who share similar interests14. Oth-
er social media also seek to be fun to play with and satisfy entertainment needs of users.15 Because we 
focus on social media that play an important role in online public opinion, the needs that social media 
experts identified as central to WeChat, Weibo, and Tieba are seeking information, strengthening 
knowledge and understanding, gaining respect as well as social needs to develop and maintain social 
networks.  
 Social media experts emphasize that product managers make a choice as to which user need to 
concentrate on when designing the platform. We call those the platform’s core functions, which is 
linked to user need. For example, a marketing researcher of Weibo explains that Weibo is maximized 
towards making people into the source of information; therefore, interactive technology strengthens 
information needs on Weibo.16 In contrast, WeChat was designed to maximize the maintenance of in-
timate social interaction between friends, family, and acquaintances, satisfying social needs. 17 Tieba 
focuses on bringing people with similar interest together and promoting discussion within each interest 
group, which places information needs at its core. When designing technology, this core function forms 
the standard according to which the company invests resources to develop the platform and in terms of 
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how the company measures its success in attracting users and keeping them engaged with the plat-
form.18 
 These examples reveal the commercial rationale behind technological design. None of the social 
media platforms we focus on here are built with a political purpose in mind, but instead intend to satis-
fy certain user demands, broadly defined. Below we uncover how the incentives built into the techno-
logical design of WeChat, Weibo, and Tieba facilitate or hinder political engagement and expression as 
one unintended way in which users use social technology. To uncover these incentives, we talked to 
social media experts about the platforms interactivity. 
 
Interactive Design of Weibo, WeChat, and Tieba 
Interactivity constitutes a way for us to discuss politics with project managers in an apolitical way. 
Building on research by Sally J. McMillan and Jang-Sun Hwang (2002), we asked social media experts 
about the platform’s responsiveness to messages and control of the user over the communication. These 
elements of a platform’s interactive technological design enable us to assess how the platform struc-
tures the communication process. Responsiveness and user control aim to strengthen the platform’s 
core function. According to social media experts, responsiveness captures the timely and correct re-
sponses users receive either from the system or from other users, while user control offers users a sense 
of control over the social media platform and the ability to take certain tasks in line with the core func-
tion. 19 Next we explain how responsiveness and user control figure into the structure of communica-
tion on WeChat, Weibo, and Tieba, according to our interviews. 
 
User control 
User control manifests itself in terms of choices that users have over the social media platform (e.g., 
Laurel 1986, 1997). Weibo originally copied most of the choices for users from Twitter, but has added 
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additional choices to its original design to accommodate trends related to its core function. These 
choices are always made based on considerations regarding whether they help users to become the 
source of information and manage information they receive. Weibo has a 140-word limit on tweets 
enabling fast dissemination and consumption of key information while also allows users to attach long 
articles to a post in order to better integrate bloggers as new sources for information. 20 In addition, us-
ers also can post pictures in their comments in order to share information. 21 Most importantly, Weibo 
users can group accounts they follow and view information by these groups. From Weibo manager’s 
point of view22, this function is crucial for its core function as it helps to reduce information flow for 
users, which tends to be massive on Weibo. This function, technically speaking, is not difficult to de-
velop. But both WeChat and Baidu Tieba do not have this function, because seeking information is 
only a secondary feature for WeChat, while information is always contained and grouped within inter-
est groups on Baidu Tieba.  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Compared to Weibo, Tieba focuses on seeking and generating information within interest groups, 
which manifests itself in two key user choices, according to one Tieba product manager: first, any user 
of Tieba can form a group and become a group administrator in charge of managing a group. Second, 
Tieba offers a unique design called “mezzanine floor comment structure” (see Figure 2). In architec-
ture, a mezzanine floor is an intermediate floor between the main floors of a building and is not count-
ed as a floor. On Tieba it refers to all replies to a comment appearing underneath a comment, instead of 
the original post; and these replies are part of the comment they are linked to. This unique feature aims 
to promote discussion within interest groups and the development of sub-groups and new interest 
groups. Users can leave the current group and form another new group based on joined interest. 
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Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
In contrast to Weibo and Tieba, WeChat focuses on maintaining intimate social relationships. 
WeChat does this by offering users various options to chat, such as text, voice, and short video. As a 
very popular feature, users can record and send voice messages with a maximum length one minute 
each. When using WeChat’s instant messenger, users can create different groups and have group chats. 
Neither Weibo nor Tieba is able to compete with Wechat on this aspect.  “I think Weibo realized the 
importance of social interaction and did develop some group chat functions before; but the products 
containing social interaction functions were not popular and failed in the end.”23 On Tieba users leave 
each other QQ number or WeChat number if they want to contact each other outside of Tieba platform. 
One Tieba product manager admitted that social interaction feature is not Tieba’s strength: “we should 
just continue with the current division of labor and do what we are good at.”24 
By contrast, WeChat has limitations built into information sharing, which mostly takes place 
via public accounts on Moments. WeChat users gain access to public accounts via subscription ac-
counts (, Dingyuehao). “On Dingyuehao, the list of public accounts is folded and users need to 
click on subscription accounts button to unfold the list. And each public account is allowed to post once 
per day, although there is no restriction on the number of articles each account can post per time.”25As 
a professor in new media explained, “WeChat does not want user experience of social interactions to be 
interrupted by the dissemination of public information.”26 
Overall, a formal and structural organization of information is required for WeChat users if they 
want to generate information that can be disseminated. In comparison, Weibo and Tieba users enjoy 
more freedom to generate information, but the difference between Weibo and Tieba lies in whether 
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information is organized based on the individual user or the interest of a group of users. By contrast, 
WeChat offers users more options to interact with others socially.  
 
Responsiveness 
The relatedness of sequential messages is one important aspect of responsiveness (Rafaeli, 1988, 
p.111). With regards to social interactions, responsiveness is straightforward: “when you ask a ques-
tion, someone will answer it; when you post a picture, someone will give you a thumb-up; when you 
express a terrible experience you had, someone will give you sympathy. It means that you can get what 
you want immediately.”27 WeChat’s instant messenger offers real time one-to-one communication and 
group communication and is therefore strong in this regard. If users wanted to engage in one-to-one 
communication or a small group chat on Weibo or Tieba, they usually move to an instant messenger, 
even though Weibo and Tieba also offer a private messenger as a feature, according to product manag-
ers. As an associate professor in media and communication explained, WeChat “users can communi-
cate with others anytime and anywhere they want”. 28 WeChat provides more responsiveness between 
users under the setting of real time communication. 
 Regarding information-sharing, however, WeChat is less responsive compared to Weibo and 
Tieba. When forwarding the relatedness of sequential messages is largely maintained on Weibo: users 
can forward posts with any picture, link, or video and subsequent comments about the original post by 
others, as long as it does not exceed the 140-word limit.  Tieba, on the other hand, uses the “mezzanine 
floor comment structure,” which categorizes messages and replies about the same issue into one group 
and increases the relatedness of sequential messages. 29 On WeChat, however, only links created by 
WeChat public accounts, various online websites or mainstream media’s accounts can be forwarded 
and the comments about the links by users’ contacts cannot be shared unless users manually copy and 
paste the comments to the new posts.   
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Another important aspect of responsiveness is how responsive the system is to the preferences set 
by the user. As a marketing researcher of a social network site in China mentioned30, Weibo and Tieba 
both deliver posts that match the user’s interest, while on WeChat Moments posts are ordered in chron-
ological order and on subscription accounts of WeChat, users just get what they subscribe to. WeChat 
does not recommend public accounts, for example, that match user’s interest.  
The final aspect of responsiveness is the speed of information delivery. Public account users on 
WeChat are allowed to post once per day, regardless of the number of article posted per time. In other 
words, information on public accounts of WeChat is only updated once per day. On Weibo and Baidu 
Tieba, there is no such restriction and users can post any time as they want. As such, information is 
more up to date on Weibo and Baidu Tieba.  
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
As can be seen, on seeking and generating information, Weibo and Baidu Tieba are more respon-
sive in that they maintain the relatedness of sequential messages, are responsive to user’s preference 
when delivering information and allow timely delivery of information. Tieba arranges information ac-
cording to topics, while Weibo arranges information according to users.31 WeChat, on the other hand, 
is more responsive on social interactions by allowing users to chat in real time.  
 
Privacy Settings and Social Networks  
As mentioned earlier, existing literature on social media has mostly focused on how the structure of 
social networks within social media platforms contributes to information diffusion and public discourse 
taking place. Although our focus here is on responsiveness and user control it is also helpful to explain 
how digital technology manages the structure of social networks via its public and private settings.  
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Insert Table 3 here 
 
Due to its emphasis on close ties in small groups, WeChat poses restrictions on access to infor-
mation based on a user’s contacts. Information on Weibo and Tieba, however, is accessible to any user 
of the platform. On Weibo, a user can view posts by other users regardless of whether they are friends 
with each other or not; unless a user sets restrictions on who can view the posts, what the user posts is 
also accessible to any user on Weibo. The difference between Weibo and Baidu Tieba is where infor-
mation is located: Information posted on Tieba can be found within each interest group, while infor-
mation posted on Weibo is on each user’s own page. Similarly, on WeChat, users can only interact with 
their contacts, while on Weibo and Baidu Tieba, users can interact with any user on the platform.  
 Decisions about which information remains private and which is accessible to the public are 
closely linked to the social networks of the platform: “Wechat is like a living room and Weibo is like a 
square […]: [on a square] everyone can voice their opinions regardless of whether they know each oth-
er, while you will only invite people who you know to your living room”.32 Tieba is a place where peo-
ple can find others with similar interest and discussions are arranged according to themes of interest 
and thus contained within each discussion forum. As such, Tieba is like a workshop for those who are 
interested in the topic and others are free to join.33  
 
Interactivity and Online Public Opinion 
How do responsiveness and user control relate to the rise of online public opinion? Here, we offer some 
preliminary evidence based on qualitative interviews with ninety-two users, varying in terms of gender, 
education, age, and region. Interviews with Internet users were conducted over two periods - between 
January and May 2015 and between Oct 2015 and March 2016. 34  In our semi-structured interviews we 
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asked users how they used WeChat, Tieba, and Weibo in order to talk to each other or share infor-
mation regarding politics.35   
 As explained earlier, when a concern or problem is formed, the issue is first discussed in a group 
that is hospitable to it (Davison, 1958). When discussion takes place on WeChat’s instant messenger 
the platform can contribute to incubating an issue. A few interviewees explained that when they find 
interesting news or information on WeChat, they prefer to share it with their friends one-to one or with-
in a group chat, instead of sharing it on Moments.36 Because WeChat structures communication within 
close networks, users express hesitation to voice and discuss politics on Moments. 
For example, a female interviewee explained that she recently posted an original post about her 
positive views of homosexuality on Moments of WeChat where she was cautious to express her view 
implicitly in the context of a movie called “Blue is the warmest color,” a love story between two fe-
males on her moments.37 Instead of expressing her view directly, she related the movie to an influential 
TV show in China called “Weirdo talk”38 which challenges mainstream views and talked about the so-
cial implication of such movies and shows. “I have relatives, friends, colleagues from work on my 
WeChat’s contact list, and I have to be prepared that all of them will see what I write. I need to keep 
this in mind when I write.”39 When being asked whether she receives the comments she expected, she 
replied: “There was very few comments and not a single one joined the discussion. Even those few 
comments are social comments, such as liking the post, or commenting that your new profile picture is 
beautiful, or comments like ‘homosexual movie?’. But none of my contacts engage in the discussion 
about the movie, about the social implication of the movie or about the development of Chinese socie-
ty”.40 She felt that comments and responses on WeChat are hijacked by social politeness, that is people 
respond “not because I feel passionate to do it, but because I feel like I should”.41 Because of social 
politeness induced by the focus of WeChat on social interactions between contacts, many interviewees 
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perceive WeChat a tool for social communication and interactions, a perfect substitution for the mobile 
phone message function42, but not for voicing and disseminating opinions.43 
Tieba, on the other side, serves as an issue incubator for public opinion. Allowing each user to set 
up their own interest group and the unique “mezzanine floor comment structure” facilitate the for-
mation of issue publics. People who find out that they share similar views about an issue set up their 
own sub-groups and continue further discussion about the issue. Facts and opinions about the issue 
concerned can be fully discussed and revealed under such a group setting. Although Tiaba is not de-
signed for the purpose of discussing politics, the group structure enables heated discussion regarding 
any issues, including politics, and facilitates the formation of common opinions within the group.44 In 
addition, setting up and managing a new group on Tieba inevitably leads to the formation of a group 
structure and group leadership, which facilitates the emergence of leadership at the issue formation 
stage. 45 A male Weibo and Tieba user explained the difference between the two platforms as follows: 
“On Tieba, we gather together because we all like, let say, one super star, and we get to know all in-
formation about him and activities organized to support him. And members can interact with each other, 
which Weibo does not have. I mean that members can comment underneath the main post and there is 
mezzanine floor comment structure that we can even interact underneath a comment.”46 On Tieba he 
has a sense of belonging to a group that has a structure and the members of which share common inter-
est, while on Weibo he does not have this sense of belonging. This sense of belonging to a community 
or group is conducive to the discussion and formation of opinions (Klandermans and Stekelenburg 
2013). For an issue to survive, to develop and to disseminate, small groups need to be hospitable to the 
issue (Davison, 1958) and act as “a radiating nucleus for an idea” (Lasswell, 1930, p.187).  
Weibo offers users the power to be the source of information, compared to Baidu Tieba and 
Wechat, it lacks the group structure that could help bring about discussion of an issue during the incu-
bation stage. Yet, it is the key venue for the discussion about an issue to transit small groups and be-
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come a topic for inter-group communication. In other words, Weibo turns an issue discussed in small 
groups into a public issue. Several features of Weibo facilitate this process. First, users have a wide 
range of choice over the format of posts and thus facilitate the fast production of information about the 
issue concerned in breadth. Second, relatedness of sequential comments on Weibo facilitates the dis-
cussion of the issue concerned in depth. Last but not least, Weibo is accessible to the public and thus 
help to raise awareness of the issue among a large number of people. The male interviewee mentioned 
above also pointed out the ability of Weibo to turn an issue into a public issue: “Information can spread 
very quickly [on Weibo]. For example, as far as I know, most information about corruption and other 
negative news emerge as discussion topics on Tieba; but these news are shared and forwarded by a 
significant large audience at a very short time through Weibo. [......] [On Weibo, for example] I want to 
record an issue or publish a piece of news; and others might have seen it and forwarded it; and this 
chain of forwarding the post can go from one to ten, from ten to a hundred and then from hundreds to 
thousands of people. At the end, everyone knows the issue. This is one reason why many people are 
still using Weibo.”47 In other words, the ability of Weibo to allow dissemination of information and 
opinions to a large number of people in a fast manner is a key selling point of Weibo, from the user’s 
perspective. Forwarding feature on Weibo, different from WeChat, contains sequential comments about 
the original link or post allowing the dissemination of opinions and users get to see how an idea is 
developed.  
Compared to WeChat, Weibo offers greater publicness but it does not discourage political com-
munication as WeChat does on its Moments. This has to do with the social networks created by the 
public and private settings of the social media platforms. On a square, the majority of the audience a 
speaker faces are strangers, while in a living room a speaker faces visitors who know the speaker per-
sonally. As one interviewee put it: “Because [on Weibo] strangers don’t know who I am, I don’t care 
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what they might think of me; while on Moments of WeChat, it is different as everyone knows who you 
are.”48  
After an issue has been posted on Weibo, people might circulate the information back to their so-
cial groups on Wechat or Tieba, but the difference at this stage is that the issue becomes a public issue 
and is discussed in many small groups instead of few groups at the issue incubation stage. Thus, Weibo 
serves as a key venue that brings the issue to the attention of a wider audience and fosters inter-group 
communication. 
 
Conclusion 
In the debate about the potential liberalizing role of social media in authoritarian states cyber-optimists 
and cyber-skeptics have so far focused on ways in which states censor and manipulate this content, and 
ways in which users may undermine state control. Instead of state regulations and the content of online 
discussion, here we have focused on interactivity in order to explore the various structures for political 
discussion that are created by the technological design of social media companies. This is an important 
dimension specific to the Internet which facilitates certain kinds of actions taken by users while limit-
ing others. By comparing Weibo, WeChat, and Baidu Tieba as the three social media with the largest 
user bases in China we have discovered that IT companies aim to attract specific kinds of users by sat-
isfying one very specific demand that users have, such as spreading information, finding people with 
common interests, and sustaining intimate relationships. Every interaction the user has with the system 
or other users is optimized towards this one core function. Core functions are kept as general as possi-
ble to attract a large and active user base, as a large and active user base directly translates into profit 
for the IT company. Social media are therefore rarely created with a particular political purpose in 
mind. 
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While Weibo clearly has the largest potential to facilitate the rise of online public opinion on polit-
ically relevant topics, we should not underestimate the potential of WeChat and Baidu Tieba for incu-
bating issues and forming opinions that are essential for public opinion to rise and mobilizing collective 
action. The group structure of Baidu Tieba is conducive to the discussion of issues among people shar-
ing similar interest and the formation of opinions. The maintenance of groups on Baidu Tieba also in-
evitably leads to the emergence of leadership that is also crucial for the rise of public opinion. But, giv-
en that Baidu Tieba is arranged according to interest, some interest groups are far more likely that oth-
ers to stimulate public opinion formation, especially those that are closely related to public interest, 
such as health related groups. Although WeChat places restrictions on generating and disseminating 
public information, its social interaction feature strengthens social bonds among people who already 
know each other. Its real time chat remains a powerful venue for people to disseminate information, 
discuss issues and incubate opinions more privately in small groups. While both are limited with re-
spect to their ability to organize around political issues, there are also possibilities. Baidu Tieba limits 
the creation of groups based on what is considered as politically sensitive topics, but politics pops up as 
a topic in groups that are organized based on non-political interest. WeChat’s real-time chat can help to 
address coordination problems, though there is restriction imposed on groups with more than 100 
members. For groups more than 100 members, each member is obliged to link their WeChat to a Chi-
nese bankcard in order to join the group. In other words, members of large group are required to regis-
ter with their real identities. While these limitations make it harder for outsiders to observe political use 
compared to the public forum Weibo, these social media still provide opportunities for users with polit-
ical motives to capture the platform.  
Social media companies in China are aware of the possibility that some users capture social me-
dia for a political purpose. However, they are also aware that social media differ in terms of their po-
tential, depending on the design. Among the three social media we study here, Weibo is the only one 
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that directly challenges state autonomy over information as it is designed to empower users to become 
the information source and spread information online in a public forum and across social media plat-
forms. Not surprisingly, when asked which social media facilitates online public opinion best, most 
interviewees state that no Chinese social media do except one: Weibo.49 Sina was able to create such a 
platform because it could sell the idea that Weibo would facilitate the guidance of online public opin-
ion by imposing a certain structure onto the discussion. An analysis of online discussion on Weibo 
about an issue, for example, can help Renmin net to find a way to construct a positive post that guides 
online discussion towards the direction in the favour of Renmin net.50 Thus, Weibo could both, serve a 
commercial purpose and simultaneously aid in guiding public opinion. Similar arguments are frequent-
ly made by traditional media outlets that have to simultaneously serve the market and the state (see, for 
example, Zhao 1998, Lee 2000, Stockmann 2013). While social media are not created with a political 
purpose in mind, commercial companies seek frames that allow them to sell the platform’s idea to the 
regime. 
In addition to working together with partners in order to actively shape online public opinion, so-
cial media companies also build politics into the technological design and management of content, de-
pending on the platforms potential to contribute to information cascades. Depending on the platform’s 
potential to contribute to information cascades, different strategies of censorship and control are built 
into the platform. For example, on WeChat, it is difficult to spread information due to limitations im-
posed on the number of people who can be added to a group. For groups with more than 100 members, 
every member needs to link their bank account with their WeChat. “It is an act that requires you to 
submit some documentations. Why? Because small groups have no impact [while big ones have and 
thus need to be registered].”51 In contrast, “authorities only need to make sure that they control the big 
Vs [on Weibo]”52 , as they are influential in spreading information and facilitating the rise of public 
opinions. Tieba is characterized by a phenomenon called “Baoba” (), which refers to users delib-
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erately posting a massive amount of information within a short period of time. This happens frequently 
when two Tieba groups disagree with each other and continue to re-post information, using insulting 
language. The Tieba product manager drew an analogy of this phenomenon to protests: “in real life 
when people have grievances they may use protests as a means to express, which is not allowed and the 
police will take care of that. Similarly, on Tieba, we have our rules and regulations [surveillance by 
machine or human being to detect these activities on Tieba] to make sure that such kind of activities 
would not ruin our user experience.”53 These strategies remain specific to the core function for which 
the platform was created. 
Social media can be appropriated for political purposes and companies develop strategies to col-
laborate with partners to actively shape online public opinion or build in limitations to prevent infor-
mation cascades. While companies do not openly talk about the political considerations informing digi-
tal intervention, it is likely that broader trends in political climate do play a role when making decisions 
about product development. For example, space for media reporting undergo cycles of opening and 
closing depending on leadership cycles; Weibo emerged at a time when the Hu-Wen administration 
actively promoted public feedback mechanisms for policy-making at a time when space for media was 
relatively open, while WeChat emerged shortly before a leadership transition when space for media 
tends to tighten (Stockmann, 2013). Despite these broader trends that may inform decision-making of 
social media companies we have not found evidence that the Chinese state actively intervenes and 
promotes certain social media platforms via regulations. It has been speculated that a crackdown on 
opinion leaders (so-called “Big Vs”) on Weibo has diverted some users to WeChat. However, accord-
ing to our interviews54, Big Vs have become more cautious and voice their opinions less frequently as a 
result of the crackdown, which makes Weibo transit from a platform with opinion leaders at its core to 
a platform where content is mostly created by ordinary users. The crackdown had a stronger influence 
on content than user numbers.   
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Overall, social media are primarily designed to attract a large and active user base. With one func-
tion at its core, social media can be appropriated for political purposes by users. Platforms like Tieba 
and WeChat will not take over the role of Weibo, simply because they were designed to satisfy de-
mands that are not directly challenging the autonomy of the state over information. Despite these hid-
den politics in technological design, political considerations still enter the design of social media plat-
forms as commercial companies anticipate how technological designs fit with the broader strategy to-
wards managing online public opinion. By actively shaping and manipulating the broader information 
environment the government can indirectly influence product design and facilitate digital innovation to 
foster the power of online public opinion or inhibit it. 
 
 
Notes: 
                                                
1 QQ constitutes another instant messenger designed by Tencent, just like WeChat. We chose WeChat, because 
it is frequently mentioned in the discussion about online public opinion in China and because of its growing user 
base; as of June 2015 WeChat had 600 million monthly active users and QQ 800 million. Interview with a mar-
keting expert (73583), Feb 2015. 
2 Interview with a Weibo product manager (75591), Apr 2015.  
3 http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/2015-03-11/doc-iawzuney0631454.shtml, accessed on 28 May 2015. 
4 Interview with a Baidu Tieba senior manager (72906), 15 Apr 2015. 
5 http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/2015-03-18/doc-icczmvun6903718.shtml, accessed on 28 May 2015. 
6 Interview with an Android app designer (77493), Mar 2015. Interview with a Weibo product manager (75591), 
Apr 2015.  
7 Interview with a Weibo product manager (75591), Apr 2015.  
For a detailed explanation of how a user profile can be drawn with the user data, please see 
http://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MjM5MjAxMDM4MA==&mid=204130207&idx=1&sn=cb13c668214b5395
3e827a73f7f55066&scene=1&key=fbe9f9f4b565962cad29895804fc9a904cbe1e9f147f3e0f5bcff8023d929c76a7
ad0ec2b7f209dc512e3cfd08b52e9a&ascene=0&uin=NzA0NzM0OTIx&devicetype=iMac+MacBookPro11%2C
1+OSX+OSX+10.10.2+build(14C1514)&version=11020012&pass_ticket=RzV5EB8nIaTFivtqTnJ6BZ%2FSJU
LMD7eqxMaVge%2BQElgLlnlDmaEqf3lyqSIgxk11, accessed on 2 Jun 2015. 
8 A number of IT professionals we interviewed confirmed this link between interactivity and business interest 
among Chinese social media. Interview with a Weibo product manager (75591), Apr 2015. Interview with a 
Baidu Tieba senior product manager (72906), Apr 2015. Interview with an Android app designer (77493), Mar 
2015. 
9 Here, influence refers to increasing number of active users and more actions performed by users, as the number 
of monthly active users has been used widely by social media companies to indicate their influence.  
10 Interview with a Baidu Tieba senior product manager (72906), Apr 2015. 
11 Interview with a product manager of a small social media company specialized in photo sharing (76465), Apr 
2015. 
12 Interview with an Android app designer (77493), Mar 2015. 
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13 Interview with an Android app designer (77493), Mar 2015. 
14 Interview with a Baidu Tieba senior product manager (72906), Apr 2015. 
15 Interview with a marketing manager of a big social media company in China (73583), Feb 2015. 
16 Interview with a Weibo marketing researcher (73359), Apr 2015. 
17 Interview with a marketing manager of a big social media company in China (73583), Feb 2015. 
18 Interview with a Weibo marketing researcher (73359), Apr 2015. 
19 Interview with an Android App designer (77493), March 2015. Interview with a Baidu Tieba senior product 
manager (72906), April 2015. 
20 Interview with a Weibo product manager (75591), Apr 2015. 
21 Interview with a Weibo product manager (75591), Apr 2015. 
22 Interview with a Weibo product manager (75591), Apr 2015. 
23 Interview with a Weibo marketing researcher (73359), Apr 2015. 
24 Interview with a Baidu Tieba senior product manager (72906), Apr 2015. 
25 Interview with a Weibo product manager (75591), Apr 2015. 
26 Interview with a professor in new media (75919), Apr 2015. 
27 Interview with an Android app designer (77493), Mar 2015. 
28 Interview with an associate professor in media and communication (72286), Apr 2015. 
29 Interview with a Baidu Tieba senior product manager (72906), Apr 2015. 
30 Interview with a marketing research of a social network site in China (79696), April 2015. 
31 On Baidu Tieba, all replies to a comment are appeared as a part of the specific comment, while on Weibo, 
only when two persons continue to reply to each other underneath a post will the “view the communication” 
feature be available.  
32 Interview with an associate professor in political science in China (75154), April 2015.  
33 Interview with an associate professor in social psychology (71963), Mar 2015. 
34 We selected interviewees using multiple entry points to decrease selection bias in snowball sampling. Among the ninety-
two interviewees, forty-two are male and fifty are female; thirty-nine were students at higher education institutes. These 
students were selected from universities in Beijing, Changsha, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Xiamen and Zhangjiajie. In terms of 
age, our sample consists of fifty-four interviewees younger than 30, twenty-six between 30 and 49, and twelve between 50 
and 75. In terms of education, we have fifty-nine interviewees with an education of college or above. Apart from six inter-
viewees residing overseas at the time of the interview, eighty-six interviewees were living in urban cities or rural counties of 
fifteen provinces or municipalities in China. These provinces or municipalities include Anhui, Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, 
Hainan, Heilongjiang, Hubei, Hunan, Jilin, Shandong, Shanghai, Shanxi, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Tianjin. 
35 We conducted most interviews face-to-face interview and a few by telephone. We started the conversation with ques-
tions about media consumption, followed by questions about seeking information about politics and posting, 
sharing or commenting about politics on the social media platforms. In order to capture the meaning of politics 
in China’s context we prompted users with three expressions referring to politics: news and social hot topics 
(Shishi yu Shehui Redian
	), political news and social ot topics (Shizheng yu Shehuiredian

	), and national big affairs (Guojia Dashi). 
36 Interview with 88206, February 2016; Interview with 80238, December 2015.  
37 Interview with 81738, January 2016. 
38 The weirdo talk contains a debate competition on a chosen topic between two groups of debaters in each epi-
sode; and it is renowned for the wild and extreme arguments the players can make in the show. 
39 Interview with 81738, January 2016. 
40 Interview with 81738, January 2016.  
41 Interview with 81738, January 2016. 
42 Interview with 34884, February 2015. 
43 Interview with 82206, December 2015; Interview with 80238, December 2015; Interview with 89142, January 
2016. 
44 Interview with an associate professor in social psychology (71963) and an assistant professor in political sci-
ence (70696), Mar 2015. 
45 Interview with a Baidu Tieba senior product manager (72906), Apr 2015. 
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46 Interview with 80643, November 2015.  
47 Interview with 80643, November 2015. 
48 Interview with 81402, January 2016.  
49 Interviews with three academics studying social media, October 2014. 
50 Interview with a Weibo product manager (75591), Apr 2015. 
51 Interview with a former member of a provincial news center (70235), Apr 2015. 
52 Interview with a former member of a provincial news center (70235), Apr 2015. 
53 Interview with a Baidu Tieba senior product manager (72906), Apr 2015. 
54 Interview with an associate professor in social psychology (71963), Mar 2015. 
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Figure 1 The two-dimensional mapping of various Chinese online media 
 Figure 2. Screenshot of the “mezzanine floor comment structure” on Baidu Tieba 
Source: http://tieba.baidu.com/p/3845088799, accessed on June 26, 2015 
 
Table 1 Level of interactivity of Weibo, WeChat, and Baidu Tieba on user control 
 Weibo Wechat Baidu Tieba 
Core function Users as the source of information Promoting intimate social relationships Finding interest groups  
Seeking and 
generating 
information 
•! Users can post content in various 
formats including long articles in 
addition to the 140-word tweets. 
•! Users can post pictures in comments. 
•! Users can group accounts they follow 
and view information by these groups. 
•! Users need to set up public accounts in 
order to generate information that can be 
disseminated.  
•! Anyone can set up a public account, but 
each public account is allowed to post 
once per day, regardless of the number 
of articles per time.  
•! Users can form groups and 
become the group administrator. 
•! Through the “mezzanine floor 
comment structure” users can 
easily engage in discussion of 
sub-topics and create further 
division of groups. 
Social 
interaction 
•! Chatting is a button at the bottom right 
of the first page, requiring one click to 
open it. 
•! Limited chatting options. 
•! Chatting is on the first page after 
logging-in. 
•! Various options to chat: text, voice and 
video. 
•! Private message box is one option 
on the top right of the first page, 
requiring a few click to reach. 
•! Limited chatting options. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Level of interactivity of Weibo, WeChat, and Baidu Tieba on responsiveness 
 Weibo Wechat Baidu Tieba 
Seeking and 
generating 
information 
•! Users can forward posts with any 
picture, link, or video and subsequent 
comments about the original post by 
others, as long as it does not exceed 
the 140-word limit. 
•! System delivers posts or contacts that 
the user may be interested in. 
•! Information can be delivered in any 
time and in various formats and thus 
is frequently updated. 
•! On Moments, comments by contacts 
cannot be shared.   
•! System orders posts on Moments in 
chronological order with the most 
recent ones on top. On subscription 
accounts of WeChat, users just get 
what they subscribe to. 
•! On public accounts, each public 
account is allowed to post once per day 
and thus information is updated less 
frequently. 
•! The “mezzanine floor comment 
structure” arranges replies 
according to discussion topics. 
•! System delivers the top posts that 
match the user’s interest. 
•! Users can post any time as they 
want.  
Social 
interactions 
Private chatting box is perceived by 
experts as failure in promoting real time 
communication. 
Real-time chatting available. 
 
Private message box functions more 
like an email box; not convenient for 
chatting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Privacy Settings of Weibo, WeChat, and Baidu Tieba  
 Weibo Baidu Tieba WeChat 
Access to information  Anyone Anyone  User’s contacts 
Access to social interaction Anyone Anyone User’s contacts 
 
